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The Effects of Experience, Choice Architecture, and Cognitive Reflection  
in Individual and Strategic Decisions 
 
Mark Schneider*   David Porter*  
This Version: January 18, 2018  
  Abstract 
We study how performance in strategyproof mechanisms and individual lottery choices is affected by 
experience with the decision environment, choice architecture (selection among strategically equivalent 
mechanisms), and cognitive reflection. In both individual and strategic decisions, we observe substantial 
gaps in performance between high reflective and low reflective participants. We also find that choice 
architecture and experience narrow these gaps in performance. Our primary finding is that experience serves 
as a substitute for cognitive reflection: Across a series of experiments employing multiple rounds of a 
lottery task, a second price sealed bid auction, an English clock auction, and a random serial dictatorship 
allocation mechanism, we consistently find that the performance of low reflection participants with 
experience is similar to that of high reflection participants without experience. We also find across all tasks 
that switching from a strategyproof to an ‘obviously strategyproof’ mechanism has a larger effect on 
performance than the difference of having a low level versus a high level of cognitive reflection, providing 
evidence that choice architectures can systematically induce or reduce the prevalence of rational behavior. 
A policy implication emerging from our results is that transparent mechanisms and familiar mechanisms 
(those with which participants have experience) can serve to increase the frequency of optimal decisions 
and efficient allocations in society. 
Keywords: Cognitive Reflection; Stochastic Dominance; Second Price Auction; English Clock Auction 
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1.   Introduction   
In recent years interest has grown in allocation procedures or ‘mechanisms’ that are dominant 
strategy incentive compatible. In such mechanisms, it is optimal, regardless of one’s beliefs about other 
agents’ actions, to report one’s true preferences to the mechanism. Mechanisms with this property are 
‘strategyproof’: agents cannot improve their payoffs by strategically misreporting their preferences. In 
many cases, there are multiple ways to implement a given dominant strategy equilibrium. For instance, 
implementing a second price sealed bid auction or an English clock auction should, in theory, implement 
the same equilibrium outcome (Vickrey, 1961). However, in order for players to play a dominant strategy, 
they must first know that they have a dominant strategy and they must know which strategy is dominant. 
Recognizing this, Li (2017) formalized a refinement of dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms 
called ‘obviously strategyproof’ (OSP) mechanisms in which it is easier to identify the dominant strategy 
than in mechanisms which are merely strategyproof but not OSP.  
Decisions with dominant strategies have not traditionally been considered as a source of 
heterogeneity in behavior. Even those who doubt that people routinely conform to the independence axiom 
of expected utility theory might still expect people to select a dominant strategy when it is available. This 
distinction is naturally captured by a distinction between two forms of rational behavior proposed by Gilboa 
et al. (2010) which they refer to as ‘objective rationality’ and ‘subjective rationality’. They argue that a 
choice is ‘objectively rational’ if the decision maker can convince others she made the right choice. In 
contrast, they refer to a choice as 'subjectively rational' if the decision maker cannot be convinced she made 
the wrong choice. Under these qualitative definitions, subjective rationality pertains to matters of preference 
and belief (since there is ‘no disputing tastes’). A decision maker whose decisions are consistent with her 
own preferences and who best-responds to her beliefs about the actions of others conforms to subjective 
rationality. Objective rationality naturally pertains to decisions and games with dominant strategies.  
Much research has focused on measuring the parameters of subjective rationality such as risk 
preferences, time preferences, and subjective probabilities. Considerably less attention has been devoted to 
identifying differences in objective rationality, partially because all agents are traditionally assumed to play 
dominant strategies when available, and thereby all agents have the same degree of objective rationality. 
Moreover, while there are standard methods for eliciting risk and time preferences, it is not clear what 
would be a reliable method for identifying heterogeneity in objective rationality in the narrowly defined 
sense of choosing dominant strategies when such strategies are available.   
As a simple a priori measure of objective rationality for both individual and strategic settings, we 
employ a standard test for identifying a person’s natural tendency to reflect on his or her thought processes. 
Frederick (2005) introduced a three-question ‘cognitive reflection’ test (CRT) where the questions have 
intuitive but wrong answers and correct answers which require some reflection and found that it correlates 
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with risk and time preferences. Subsequent research has employed the CRT and related measures of 
cognitive skills to identify a propensity to engage in backward induction (e.g., Burnham et al., 2009; Levitt 
et al., 2011; Branas-Garza et al., 2012), and the ability of a market of traders who have all high levels or 
have all low levels of cognitive reflection to aggregate information (Corgnet et al., 2015). 
Using objective rationality in the narrowly defined sense of conforming to dominant strategies, we 
investigate whether the CRT can sort out differences in objective rationality across six mechanisms: two 
auctions (a second price sealed bid auction and an English clock auction), two random priority allocation 
mechanisms, and two choice architectures for making individual choices between lotteries. Using the same 
parameter values within each pair of mechanisms, each pair should, in principle, implement the same 
dominant strategy equilibrium. However, one mechanism in each pair is ‘obviously strategyproof’ (OSP) 
as defined by Li (2017) while the other is merely strategyproof1 (SP). A boundedly rational agent may be 
more likely to recognize the dominant strategy in an OSP mechanism, than in an SP mechanism. The tasks 
in the experiment are summarized in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Overview of Tasks in the Experiment 
 
 
In each session, we implemented a mechanism for two iterations to observe the effects of 
experience. The serial dictatorship mechanism and lottery choice tasks were conducted within the same 
experimental session in either a ‘transparent session’ (employing the dynamic serial dictatorship and the 
                                                          
1 We use SP to denote the class of mechanisms that are strategyproof but not obviously strategyproof.  
Non-Transparent Mechanism Transparent Mechanism
Population Second Price Sealed Bid Auction English Clock Auction
Low CRT 3 sessions / 2 iterations 3 session / 2 iterations
High CRT 3 sessions / 2 iterations 3 session / 2 iterations
Non-Transparent Mechanism Transparent Mechanism
Population Static Serial Dictatorship Dynamic Serial Dictatorship
Low CRT 4 sessions / 2 iterations 2 sessions / 2 iterations
High CRT 4 sessions / 2 iterations 2 sessions / 2 iterations
Population Non-Transparent Frame Transparent Frame
Low CRT 4 sessions / 2 iterations 2 sessions / 2 iterations
High CRT 4 sessions / 2 iterations 2 sessions / 2 iterations
Games of Incomplete Information
Games of Complete Information
Individual Choices under Risk
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transparent lottery frame) or in a ‘non-transparent session’ (employing the static serial dictatorship and the 
non-transparent lottery frame). The order of tasks was counter-balanced such that the non-transparent 
lottery task was conducted first in two of the four non-transparent sessions and it was conducted second in 
the remaining two non-transparent sessions. The order of tasks in transparent sessions was likewise 
counterbalanced. 
In our experiment, subjects make repeated decisions in each mechanism, enabling us to observe the 
effects of experience. By comparing the performance of the mechanisms within each pair, we can examine 
a role for choice architecture (which in our context involves selecting among strategically equivalent 
strategyproof mechanisms) to improve welfare. Our focus is on how the effects of cognitive reflection are 
moderated by experience and choice architecture. Our main findings are: 
(i) Cognitive reflection is a reliable measure of objective rationality in novel SP decision 
environments. 
(ii) Experience and choice architecture (using OSP instead of SP mechanisms) each reduce the gap in 
objective rationality between high and low reflection subjects and jointly eliminate the gap. 
(iii) For all six mechanisms, experience serves as a substitute for cognitive reflection: Low reflection 
subjects with experience perform similarly to high reflection subjects without experience.   
(iv) For all iterations in all treatments, the effect of transparency is greater than the effect of cognitive 
reflection.  
(v) For the individual choices between lotteries, we find that surprisingly little feedback is needed to 
substantially increase the percentage of optimal decisions, even when the expected gains from 
choosing optimally are small. 
To test for violations of objective rationality, the mechanisms used in our experiment were selected to each 
have a dominant strategy. In particular, we conducted experimental second price sealed bid auctions based 
on the design of Kagel and Levin (1993), separately for groups of high CRT subjects and low CRT subjects. 
In such auctions, there is a dominant strategy for how a person should bid, although previous experiments 
have found that many subjects do not ‘discover’ this strategy (Kagel and Levin, 1993; Kagel et al., 1987; 
Kagel, 1995). The English clock auction we employed was designed analogously to the second price design 
but where bidders can choose to exit the auction by clicking a button rather than clicking a button to submit 
their sealed bids. The two random priority allocation mechanisms (a static and a dynamic random serial 
dictatorship) were the same as in Li (2017). The two choice architectures for deciding between pairs of 
lotteries were similar to an example from Tversky and Kahneman (1986). However, none of these 
mechanisms have been studied in conjunction with cognitive reflection.  
     The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: We provide further background and motivation 
in Section 2. We then describe the experimental design and results for the auctions (Section 3), the design 
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and results for the random priority mechanisms (Section 4), and the design and results for the lottery choices 
(Section 5). Section 6 concludes. The instructions for all mechanisms are in the supplementary material. 
2.  Background and Motivation 
Several papers have considered the role of cognitive reflection in strategic settings that have 
dominated strategies with a focus on guessing games (also referred to as ‘p’-beauty contests) in particular. 
For instance, Burnham et al. (2009) and Branas-Garza et al. (2012) observe that students with lower CRT 
scores are more likely to play dominated strategies. Schnusenberg and Gallo (2011) replicate this finding 
but also observe that low CRT subjects make lower guesses in later rounds when the game is repeated. 
Our focus is on games and decisions where there is a dominant strategy. Li (2017) experimentally 
studied a second price auction, an English auction, and two random priority allocation mechanisms in order 
to compare OSP and SP mechanisms. Zhang and Levin (2017) conducted a related experiment with a 
random serial dictatorship and individual choice task. However, Li (2017) and Zhang and Levin (2017) did 
not test for the role of cognitive reflection in explaining heterogeneity in the behavior of their subjects. One 
aspect of our study is then to investigate whether differences in cognitive reflection can sort out 
heterogeneity in bidding behavior in second price sealed bid auctions and in English clock auctions, and 
how cognitive reflection might affect revenue and efficiency in these auctions.  A second aspect of our 
study is to consider the six mechanisms collectively and ask broader questions of whether cognitive 
reflection sorts out heterogeneity in objectively rational choices and how such a relationship might be 
moderated by experience with a mechanism and by choice architecture (e.g., redesigning a SP mechanism 
into an OSP mechanism).  
3. Games with Incomplete Information 
Our main experiment tests the effects of cognitive reflection, experience, and choice architecture across 
two classical mechanisms – a second price sealed bid auction and an English clock auction.  
3.1 Experimental Design for the Second Price Auction 
Eighty one2 undergraduate students at a private California university participated in the second price auction 
experiment. Six sessions were conducted – three “High CRT” sessions and three “Low CRT” sessions. 
Subjects in each of these sessions had previously taken the seven-question Cognitive Reflection Test 
(Toplak et al., 2014) which is an extension of the original three-question cognitive reflection test (CRT) 
due to Frederick (2005), at an earlier date when they signed up to participate in economic experiments. 
Knowing the subjects’ CRT scores before they come to participate in an experiment makes it possible to 
                                                          
2Eighty-four subjects were recruited for the experiment (six experimental sessions with the lab’s capacity of fourteen 
subjects per session). The high CRT population is smaller than the low CRT population. While the first two high 
CRT second price sessions each had 14 subjects, only eleven high CRT subjects attended our last high CRT session 
for the second price auction. 
6 
 
recruit subjects who only obtained particular scores (e.g., high scores or low scores). We hypothesized that 
sampling from the tails of the distribution would reveal the starkest difference in performance based on 
CRT scores and reduce the noise in the measurement of a subject’s tendency to cognitively reflect. We thus 
recruited “Low CRT” auction sessions in which all subjects had previously scored 0 or 1 on the CRT, as 
well as “High CRT” auction sessions in which all subjects had previously scored in the top 20% of the 
distribution of CRT scores (subjects who scored a 5, 6, or 7 on the CRT).  
     The second price auction experiments were based on the design of Kagel and Levin (1993). In each 
auction period, subjects participated in both a large market (where subjects competed in a group of 10 
bidders) and a small market (where subjects competed in a group of 5 bidders)3, by submitting a bid in each 
market via their bidding dashboard. Each subject received the same private valuation in the large market 
and the small market, but private valuations differed across subjects and across auction periods. For each 
auction period, private valuations were randomly drawn from a discrete uniform distribution with step size 
of $0.01, over the interval [$0.00, $28.30] which was the same distribution employed in Kagel and Levin 
(1993). Subjects knew their private valuation, the distribution from which all values were drawn, and the 
total number of bidders in each market. Subjects did not need to recall this information as it was always 
displayed to them on their market dashboard, as shown in Figure 1. After each period, the dashboard also 
displayed the winning bid, the profit made by the winning bidder and the subject’s own bid. In each period, 
either the large market or the small market was randomly selected for payment. As in Kagel and Levin 
(1993), subjects were each given a starting cash balance of $10 to cover the possibility of losses.    
 
Figure 1. Market Dashboard from Second Price Auction. Each subject submits a bid in a large market (10 
bidders) and a small market (5 bidders) in each period, with the same valuation in both markets. 
                                                          
3In auction periods where more than the number of ‘reserve’ bidders had gone bankrupt (i.e., their cash balance had 
gone negative), the large (small) market contained less than 10 (5) bidders.    
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  We conducted six experimental second price auction sessions, three each for high CRT subjects and low 
CRT subjects. A total of 81 subjects (39 high CRT subjects and 42 low CRT subjects) participated in one 
of the auction sessions. In each session, each subject was seated at a separate computer terminal in a cubicle 
such that no subject could observe the actions or computers of other subjects. Each auction session (three 
each for high CRT and low CRT subjects) involved two iterations of 20 rounds each. That is, subjects 
participated in 20 rounds of the second price auction and their earnings were calculated. Gains or losses in 
each period were added to each subject’s balance. If a subjects’ balance went negative, they were no longer 
permitted to bid in that auction iteration. At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were informed that 
they would participate in two iterations of the experiment, that they would be paid the sum of their earnings 
across both iterations, and that their balance would be reset to $10 before the second iteration (so any losses 
did not carry over).  Conducting two iterations in a session enabled us to investigate potential experience 
effects. Since many low CRT subjects went bankrupt in the first iteration (i.e., their cash balance went 
negative), conducting a second iteration also enabled us to observe the outcome of a full session of active 
bidders, as very few low CRT subjects went bankrupt twice.  
    At the start of each auction session, the large market contained ten bidders and the small market contained 
five bidders. It was intended for the large market and the small market to retain their respective sizes across 
all auction periods but this was not always possible in later auction periods due to bankruptcies. To 
anticipate this possibility, following Kagel and Levin, we recruited more than ten subjects and each subject 
was randomly assigned to ‘play’ or ‘observe’ in each period. Doing so allows for ‘reserve bidders’ to 
maintain the size of the large and small markets in case of bankruptcies. There were typically four extra 
bidders in each auction session, but even this was not always sufficient to keep the number of bidders 
constant in the large and small markets.  The software was programmed with a schedule of how to adjust 
the market sizes in the case of bankruptcies. The large market contained all remaining bidders when the 
total number of bidders dropped below ten. The small markets were balanced to be as close in size as 
possible.  
     Subjects were given detailed instructions, which are provided in the electronic supplementary material. 
They were informed of the second price rule for selecting the winning bidder and how payments were 
determined. Subjects were also informed that they could not bid more than $50 for the item being auctioned. 
No statements were included which could be seen as censoring the bidding process or nudging bidders in a 
certain direction such as “It is possible to lose money if you bid above your value, but not if you bid below 
your value.” Rather, after explaining the rules, we wanted to provide as little nudging as possible to give 
bidders the opportunity to discover the dominant bidding strategy without any ‘hints’.  
     Viewing interactive learning to also be effective in helping participants understand the rules of the 
auction, each participant saw three interactive examples, one each in which they were assigned a low value, 
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an intermediate value, and a high value. In each example participants submitted bids in their bidding 
dashboard and computerized agents were programmed with a fixed set of bids to complete the auction. 
From this part of the instructions, subjects could experience the bidding process and observe their profits 
or losses at no cost to themselves. Subjects were also quizzed by the software on the auction instructions 
and were paid $0.50 for each correct answer they provided to the five-question quiz. After all subjects 
completed the instructions, the experiment began. After all auction periods had ended, subjects were paid 
their earnings from the quiz and from the auction periods in cash in addition to a $7 participation payment. 
3.2 Experimental Design for the English Clock Auction 
To study the relationship between cognitive reflection, experience, and mechanism transparency, we also 
conducted six ‘English Clock Auction’ sessions with a different sample of undergraduate students from the 
same California university as in the second price experiment. Eighty three4 undergraduate students (41 who 
scored either a 0 or 1 on the seven-question CRT and 42 who scored either 5, 6, or 7) participated in the 
second price auction experiment. Six sessions were conducted – three “High CRT” sessions consisting only 
of participants with a score of 5, 6, or 7 on the CRT, and three “Low CRT” sessions, consisting only of 
participants with a 0 or 1 on the CRT. In each session, subjects participated in two iterations of the English 
clock auction. The first iteration of the clock auction consisted of 20 periods as in the second price sessions. 
Since the clock auctions take much longer than the second price sealed bid auctions (fixing the clock at a 
constant tick rate), and since subjects participated in both a large and small market clock auction to parallel 
the second price sessions, there was not sufficient time to also conduct 20 periods for the second iteration 
of the clock auction in a two-hour experiment. Instead, the second iteration of the clock auction contained 
10 periods, which we believed would be sufficient to study how behavior differs with experience, with 
CRT, and between the second price and clock auctions. Subjects thus participated in sixty clock auctions – 
one large clock auction (10 bidders) and one small clock auction (5 bidders) in each of 30 periods.   
     For all periods of the clock auction, the value distribution and the particular set of values in each auction 
period as well as the sequence of periods in which these values occurred was exactly the same as in the 
second price sessions so that each period in the English clock auction had the same dominant strategy 
equilibrium as the corresponding period in the second price auction.  
    In the clock auction periods, the large market always occurred first. This was done to be consistent with 
our focus on the large market in the second price session. The small market occurred immediately after 
bidding ended for the large market in each period. As in the second price sessions, subjects had the same 
value for the large and small markets. Whereas subjects entered a bid and clicked a “Submit Bid” button in 
                                                          
4Eighty-four subjects were recruited for the experiment (six experimental sessions with the lab’s capacity of fourteen 
subjects per session). One subject did not show.     
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the second price sealed bid auction, subjects in the clock auction clicked a “Do Not Buy” button when they 
no longer wanted to participate in that auction in each period. The last bidder to click the “Do Not Buy” 
button in an auction sets the price for that auction with the winning bidder being the subject who remains 
after all other bidders click “Do Not Buy.” An image of the ‘Large Market’ side of the Market Dashboard 
from the English Clock auction experiment is displayed in Figure 2. 
    In the English Clock auctions, subjects saw their value and the price of the ‘fictitious commodity’ being 
auctioned as it increased at increments of $0.25, starting at $0.00. Subjects were also shown their ‘potential 
profit’ (the difference between their value and the price) if the auction were to end at the current price. 
While such information is natural for an English Clock auction, it cannot be calculated for the second price 
sealed bid auction where there is no ‘current price’ prior to the close of the auction. As in the second price 
auction sessions, subjects were randomly paid for either the large market or the small market in each period. 
Subjects were paid their total earnings across all auction periods. This amount included a $10 starting cash 
balance from both the first and second iterations plus any gains or losses they incurred during the auction 
periods. Subjects could not lose more than their total earnings. In addition, subjects received $0.50 for each 
correct answer they provided to the quiz questions in the instructions. The instructions also included three 
interactive examples similar to those used in the second price instructions. All experimental instructions 
are contained in the supplementary material.  
 
 
Figure 2. Market Dashboard from English Clock Auction. Each subject submits a bid in a large market (10 
bidders) and a small market (5 bidders) in each period, with the same valuation in both markets. 
3.3 Experimental Results  
Since the classic work of Vickrey (1961), the second price auction (SPA) has attracted much attention in 
economics research due to its appealing properties. For instance, in such an auction with private valuations, 
it is a dominant strategy to bid exactly one’s valuation. That is, regardless of what other bidders do, it is 
optimal to bid your value. This dominant strategy equilibrium is a stronger property than a Nash equilibrium 
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where one typically needs to invoke common knowledge assumptions about others’ payoffs and their 
rationality and condition one’s bidding strategy on how he expects others to bid.   
     To get a sense of our second price data without experience effects, we first compared the distribution of 
initial bids for high and low CRT subjects. In particular, we looked at the first bid made by each bidder 
across all experimental sessions, and computed (i) the average absolute difference (in dollars) between that 
bidder’s bid and value, and (ii) the proportion of bidders who bid within $1 of their value on their initial 
bid. We performed these calculations for both the large and small markets. The average absolute deviation 
of bids from values for low CRT subjects in the large (small) market was $8.22 ($7.66). The average 
absolute deviation for high CRT subjects in the large (small) market was $2.01 ($1.94). The proportion of 
low CRT scorers who bid within $1 of their value on their first bid in the large (small) market was 0.214 
(0.238). The proportion for high CRT scorers in the large (small) market was 0.590 (0.615). Thus, high 
CRT subjects were much more likely to bid within $1 of their value than low CRT subjects. The difference 
between the proportion of first bids within $1 of the value for high and low CRT subjects is significant for 
both the large and small markets (2-tailed Z difference in proportions test, p = 0.00056 for large market and 
p = 0.00058 for small market).  
      For an English auction, we cannot determine the bid of the winning bidder as that bidder remains active 
after all other bidders have dropped out.  We can compute the average absolute deviation of bids from 
values for the initial bids of ‘non-winning bidders’ (those who did not win the first auction they participated 
in) as well as the proportion of these bidders who bid within $1 of their value on their first bid. The average 
absolute deviation of bids from values (for the initial bids of non-winning bidders) in the large market was 
$4.02 for low CRT subjects and $2.22 for high CRT subjects. The proportion of non-winning bidders who 
bid within $1 of their value on their initial bid in the larger market was 0.500 for low CRT bidders and was 
0.684 for high CRT bidders. The results for the small market are similar. These statistics are not directly 
comparable to the second price auction data noted above since those results include the initial bids of all 
bidders (including those who won the auction with their initial bid). To more directly compare the initial 
bids for the English and second price auction experiments, we can look at the bidders in the second price 
auction who did not win an auction on their first bid. Doing so, we find that for the initial bids of non-
winning bidders, the average absolute deviation of bids from values in the large market was $6.94 for low 
CRT subjects and $2.00 for high CRT subjects. In addition, the proportion of non-winning initial bids 
within $1 of the bidder’s value is 0.237 for low CRT subjects and 0.556 for high CRT subjects. This 
difference is also significant (two-tailed Z difference in proportions test, p < 0.01). In contrast the difference 
between the corresponding proportions for the English auction (0.500 for low CRT subjects and 0.684 for 
high CRT subjects) is not significant.    
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    Table 2 provides summary statistics for the second price and English clock sessions. The table displays 
(i) the number of subjects in each treatment, (ii) the proportion of subjects in these sessions who went 
bankrupt, (iii) the proportion of subjects who lost money relative to their $10 endowment, (iv) the average 
surplus (the average difference between the winning bidder’s value and the second highest bid) per auction5, 
(v) the proportion of efficient allocations across all auction periods for each iteration and (vi) the proportion 
of subjects whose average bias in a given iteration is within $1 of valuations in the large market.6 
Table 2. Data for Second Price Sealed Bid (SB) and English Clock (EC) Auctions in Large Market 
Treatment         Iteration      N Bankrupt 
Lost 
Money 
Average Surplus 
per auction ($) Efficiency 
Average 
Bias < $1 
SB Low CRT      First             42     0.667 0.690 -11.140 0.500 0.095 
SB Low CRT      Second          42 0.119 0.238 -1.540 0.600 0.381 
SB High CRT     First             39 0.077 0.231 -0.350 0.650 0.462 
SB High CRT     Second          39 0.000 0.179 1.670 0.817 0.769 
EC Low CRT     First             41 0.000 0.024 3.017 0.650 0.390 
EC Low CRT     Second          41 0.000 0.000 3.703 0.800 0.610 
EC High CRT    First              42 0.000 0.024 3.010 0.767 0.643 
EC High CRT    Second         42 0.000 0.024 3.089 0.800 0.667 
 
     In Table 2, we observe large differences between low and high CRT subjects in the first iteration of the 
second price auction. For instance, roughly two-thirds of low CRT subjects went bankrupt indicating they 
would have been better off by not bidding at all (and walking away with their full $10 endowment), whereas 
less than 8% of high CRT subjects did so. Low CRT subjects averaged more than a $1 loss in both iterations 
of the second price auction, while high CRT subjects lost less than $1 on average in the first iteration and 
earned more than $1 in profit on average in the second iteration. In addition, less than 10% of low CRT 
subjects bid within $1 of their value on average in the first iteration of the second price auction, while 46% 
of high CRT subjects did so. The large number of bankruptcies in the second price auction resulted from 
persistent overbidding. Kagel and Levin (1993) also observed frequent overbidding in second price 
auctions. They note that earlier reports of convergence to the dominant strategy in second price auctions 
(Cox et al., 1982) employed procedures which prohibited bidding above valuations. 
     For the English Clock auction, the differences between low CRT and high CRT subjects is less stark. 
As already noted for the English auction, the proportion of low CRT subjects bidding within $1 of their 
value on their first bid did not differ significantly from high CRT subjects, while the difference was highly 
significant for the second price auction. From Table 2, we further see that the gap in average surplus per 
                                                          
5Whenever the difference between the winning bidder’s value and the price (second highest bid) were greater than 
the winning bidder’s cash balance, the winning bidder went bankrupt and could not bid in later periods.    
6The average bias for a subject is calculated as the average absolute deviation of a subject’s bid from that subject’s 
value across all periods in which that subject was an active bidder. Statistics for the small markets are similar to 
those in Table 2.  
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auction between low and high CRT subjects is eliminated in the English auction. Still, there are some 
metrics on which high CRT subjects continue to perform better – particularly in the proportion of efficient 
allocations and in the proportion of subjects with an average bias of less than $1.   
    Our main finding from Table 2 is that experience serves as a substitute for cognitive reflection: low CRT 
subjects in their second iteration perform similarly to high CRT subjects in their first iteration. For instance, 
the proportion of subjects who went bankrupt or lost money, and the average earnings and efficient 
allocations are similar for ‘experienced’ low CRT subjects and ‘inexperienced’ high CRT subjects in both 
the second price and the English auction. This suggests that experience can narrow the gap in performance 
between high and low CRT subjects, thereby helping to compensate for differences in cognitive reflection. 
In the second price auction, for instance, it requires reflection or experience to recognize that bidding above 
your value can result in losses.  
     One other finding from Table 2 is that the transparency of a mechanism can narrow the gap between 
high and low CRT subjects. In particular, an English Clock auction is more transparent than a second price 
sealed bid auction since an English Clock auction makes the relationship between one’s value and the price 
of the item easy to recognize: One need only compare the value and the price to decide when to drop out of 
the bidding. However, in a second price sealed bid auction, one has to select an amount to bid from a large 
message space, and it requires more contemplation to identify the dominant strategy. 
     Indeed, from Table 2, we see that low CRT subjects perform closer to high CRT subjects in the English 
Clock auction than in the second price sealed bid auction and both groups earn more money and generate a 
greater proportion of efficient allocations in the English auction.    
     To better visualize the difference between high CRT and low CRT subjects in the second price auction, 
Figure 3 displays the distribution of all bids in the large market in periods 1 through 10 of each session (a 
total of 100 bids for a session if there were no bankruptcies). Since many low CRT subjects went bankrupt 
in the first iteration before period 10, periods 11 through 20 would be biased, displaying the bids of only a 
few bidders who ‘survived’ the market.  
     From Figure 3 we can see that the high CRT subjects bid very close to their value, even in the first 
iteration, with relatively small deviations from truthful bidding. In contrast, low CRT subjects had a much 
wider and more volatile distribution of bids, deviating considerably from the dominant strategy equilibrium 
in which bids equal values. We can also see that low CRT subjects bid much closer to their values in the 
second iteration, relative to their first iteration.  
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  To observe the change in behavior across both iterations (40 periods), the average absolute deviation of 
bids from values among all active bidders in the large market is plotted in Figure 4 (with a vertical line 
dividing the data for Iterations 1 and 2) for both the low and high CRT groups. From the figure, we see that 
high CRT subjects converged closely to the dominant strategy equilibrium by the second iteration, while 
low CRT subjects approached but did not reach the equilibrium strategy by period 40. It is surprising that 
a simple seven-question test such as the CRT that bears no direct relationship to auctions or strategic 
behavior can accurately sort out how subjects are going to bid in second price sealed bid auctions. Finally, 
note that we again observe low CRT subjects with experience (see low CRT data points in Figure 4 for 
periods 21-40) perform similarly to high CRT subjects without experience (see high CRT data points in 
Figure 4 for periods 1 – 20). 
 
Figure 3. Deviation of 
bids from values in 
the first and second 
iteration of the second 
price auction (large 
market, periods 1 
through 10) for high 
CRT subjects (left) 
and low CRT subjects 
(right). The line in the 
interior of each boxplot 
is the median deviation 
from bidding one’s 
value in periods 1 
through 10. The ends of 
each box display the 
first and third quartiles 
of the distribution. The 
ends of the whiskers 
extending from each 
box correspond to 1.5 
times the interquartile 
range. Boxplots ending 
with “I1” (“I2”) 
correspond to the first 
(second) iteration in a 
session. For instance, 
“Apr5I2” denotes the 
second iteration on 
April 5.   
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Figure 4. Average Absolute Deviation of Bids from Values among Active Bidders in Large Market     
 
    Although the high CRT auctions produced greater efficiency, the low CRT auctions produced greater 
revenue. Figure 5 displays the total revenue for periods 1 through 10 for low CRT second price and English 
auctions, high CRT second price and English auctions, and for the dominant strategy equilibrium. From 
Figure 5, we see that revenue from all second price auctions was higher than the equilibrium revenue, while 
revenues for the English auctions were slightly lower than the equilibrium revenue.  
    On average, the revenue from the first iteration of the second price auction for the low CRT sessions 
summing over periods 1 through 10 is $154.92 higher than the revenue if all players played their dominant 
strategies. In contrast, the revenue from the first iteration for the high CRT sessions summing over periods 
1 through 10 is $14.49 higher than the equilibrium revenue. Low CRT subjects with experience again look 
similar to high CRT subjects without experience. In their second iteration, low CRT subjects pay $16.33 
more than the equilibrium revenue summing over periods 1 through 10 (compared to $14.49 for high CRT 
subjects without experience). With experience, high CRT subjects pay $8.39 more than the equilibrium 
revenue. Experience thus considerably reduces deviations from equilibrium revenue for both groups. 
     For the English Clock auction, low CRT subjects with experience bid $7.52 less than the equilibrium 
revenue, whereas high CRT subjects without experience bid $8.27 less than the equilibrium revenue. High 
CRT subjects with experience bid within $2 of the equilibrium revenue. 
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Figure 5. Low CRT, High CRT, and Equilibrium Revenue for First Iteration (left) and Second Iteration (right) 
from the Second Price and English Clock Auctions (Total Revenue across Periods 1 through 10). 
 
3.4 Regression Model 
       To further analyze the data, we implemented the following regression model with session fixed effects:  
(1)        𝑙𝑛 (𝑣𝑝𝑠) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐻𝑙𝑛(𝑣𝑝𝐻) + 𝛽𝐿𝑙𝑛(𝑣𝑝𝐿) + 𝛾𝑥𝐶𝑝𝑠 + 𝜆𝑥𝑇𝑝𝑠 + 𝜙𝑥𝐶𝑇𝑝𝑠 + ∑ 𝜅𝑠𝑥𝑝𝑠 +𝑠 𝜀𝑝𝑠  
where the dependent variable, 𝑣𝑝𝑠 is the value of the winning bidder in period 𝑝 of session 𝑠. Log 
transformations were used so that the values can span the real line. The constant 𝛼 is the mean effect size 
across all treatments and the other explanatory variables are parametrized as deviations from this mean.  
Regression model (1) was implemented separately for the first iteration and the second iteration of 
the auction experiments. Only the first five periods were used since these are the only periods in which 
there were 10 active bidders in every session (for the first iteration). For the second iteration we have 10 
periods available (since there were 10 periods in the second iteration of the English clock auction). To make 
the two iterations more directly comparable, we report our regression results for the first five period of the 
first iteration (Table 3) and for the first five periods of the second iteration (Table 4), in which case, the 
same parameter values are used for each iteration. The regression results from using 10 periods in the second 
iteration are similar to those from using 5 periods.  
In (1), the variable 𝑣𝑝𝐻 = 0 for periods in low CRT sessions and for high CRT sessions it is the 
difference between the maximum valuation across all bidders in period 𝑝 and the average of the maximum 
valuations across all periods 𝑝 ∈ {1,2,3,4,5}. The variable 𝑣𝑝𝐿 = 0 for periods in high CRT sessions and for 
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low CRT sessions it is the difference between the maximum valuation across all bidders in period 𝑝 and 
the average of the maximum valuations across all periods 𝑝 ∈ {1,2,3,4,5}. The variable 𝑥𝐶𝑝𝑠 = 0.5 for 
period 𝑝 if session 𝑠 is a high CRT session and 𝑥𝐶𝑝𝑠 = −0.5 for period 𝑝 if 𝑠 is a low CRT session. The 
variable 𝑥𝑇𝑝𝑠 = 0.5 for period 𝑝 if 𝑠 is a transparent (English clock) session and 𝑥𝑇𝑝𝑠 = −0.5 for period 𝑝 
if 𝑠 is a non-transparent (second price) session. Variable 𝑥𝐶𝑇𝑝𝑠 = 0.5 for periods in transparent high CRT 
sessions and nontransparent low CRT sessions and 𝑥𝐶𝑇𝑝𝑠 = −0.5 for periods in nontransparent high CRT 
sessions and transparent low CRT sessions. This approach parametrizes the effects of CRT and transparency 
as deviations from a mean effect size. The 𝑥𝑝𝑠 variables, with 𝑠 ∈ {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12} are session 
dummy variables that equal 1 if period 𝑝 is in session 𝑠 and 0 otherwise. 
Regression model (1) enables us to identify the effects of cognitive reflection and mechanism 
transparency as well as their interaction in the context of bidding in auctions. The regression was 
implemented as a constrained regression in STATA 14.2 with the constraints that ∑ 𝜅𝑠 = 0𝑠  for each 
treatment (with three sessions per treatment). Under this constraint, each third 𝜅𝑠 value is determined given 
the values of the other two and so 𝜅𝑠 values for sessions 3, 6, 9, and 12 do not appear in Tables 3 and 4. 
Note that the standard economic prediction is that the valuation of the winning bidder should be 
fully determined by (and equal to) the maximum valuation among all bidders in the auction. Somewhat 
surprisingly, Table 3 reveals that, at least for the first five periods of Iteration 1, the maximum possible 
valuation is not related to the actual valuation of the winning bidder for either CRT group (p = 0.331 for 
high CRT subjects and p = 0.443 for low CRT subjects). That is, the only factor that should matter has no 
predictive power in the first iteration. However, both the CRT variable and the transparency variable are 
highly significant (as is their interaction). This suggests that in novel environments, variation in objective 
rationality as measured by the CRT is more predictive of market outcomes than is variation in economic 
fundamental values. In addition, for novel environments, mechanism transparency is more predictive of 
market outcomes than fundamental economic values. 
From comparing Tables 3 and 4 we can also glean some insight into the effect of experience. For 
instance, when running model (1) on the first five periods of Iteration 2, CRT and transparency continue to 
be significant, while, the coefficients on 𝑙𝑛(𝑣𝑝𝐻) and 𝑙𝑛(𝑣𝑝𝐿) that were not significant in Iteration 1 are 
now both significant for Iteration 2. Thus maximum valuations do predict market outcomes in Iteration 2. 
Also, not that while CRT and transparency are significant for both iterations, the effect sizes for CRT and 
Transparency both decline considerably between iterations (a decline from 0.488 to 0.162 for the CRT 
effect size and from 0.578 to 0.166 for the transparency effect size), suggesting that effects of CRT and 
transparency are weaker when participants have experience with their environment.  
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Table 3. Regression Results for Model (1): Auction Iteration 1 
Meaning of estimated parameters Estimated Values Std. Error p-value 
    
Mean Effect Size across all treatments (𝛼) 2.926 0.083 < 0.001 
Effect of Valuation for High CRT  (𝛽𝐻) 1.355 1.379 0.331 
Effect of Valuation for Low CRT   (𝛽𝐿) 1.067 1.379 0.443 
Cognitive Reflection Parameter (𝛾) 0.488 0.166 0.005 
Transparency Parameter (𝜆) 0.578 0.166 0.001 
Interaction Effect (𝜙) -0.441 0.166 0.010 
 
Table 4. Regression Results for Model (1): Auction Iteration 2 
Meaning of estimated parameters Estimated Values Std. Error p-value 
    
Mean Effect Size across all treatments (𝛼) 3.158 0.032 < 0.001 
Effect of Valuation for High CRT  (𝛽𝐻) 1.107 0.539 0.045 
Effect of Valuation for Low CRT   (𝛽𝐿) 1.634 0.539 0.004 
Cognitive Reflection Parameter (𝛾) 0.162 0.065 0.005 
Transparency Parameter (𝜆) 0.166 0.065 0.001 
Interaction Effect (𝜙) -0.171 0.065 0.010 
 
4. Games with Complete Information 
In addition to studying the effects of cognitive reflection, experience, and mechanism transparency 
on decision quality in games of incomplete information (Section 3), we also conducted experiments to study 
these effects in games of complete information and in individual choices under risk.   
4.1 Experimental Design for Static and Dynamic Random Serial Dictatorships 
     As a game of complete information, following Li (2017) we employed two variants of a random 
serial dictatorship (RSD). In the RSD mechanism, agents know the payoffs available to other agents, they 
are assigned a random priority, and they receive their most preferred payoff available to them when there 
priority number is reached. The RSD is both strategyproof and efficient. We employ the two variants of an 
RSD mechanism due to Li (2017): (i) a dynamic RSD in which subjects are assigned a priority number and 
then take turns choosing prizes without replacement from a list of possible prizes (an OSP mechanism), and 
(ii) a static RSD in which subjects submit a ranking over all possible prizes and then receive the highest 
ranked prize on their list when their priority number is reached (an SP mechanism). 
     Our experimental design for the random serial dictatorships is partially a replication of the RSD 
experiment in Li (2017) but with the added dimension of studying the role of cognitive reflection and how 
it relates to experience and mechanism transparency. We administered twelve experimental sessions, with 
each session involving two iterations of ten rounds of an RSD mechanism, and two iterations of ten lottery 
choices (described in Section 5). As in the auction studies, we recruited high CRT sessions and low CRT 
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sessions. In particular, we conducted six high CRT sessions: four sessions with nontransparent (static) RSD 
choices and nontransparent lottery choices and two sessions with transparent (dynamic) RSD choices and 
transparent lottery choices7. We also conducted six analogous low CRT sessions. Each session consisted of 
twelve subjects.  The software and instructions for the RSD games were the same as those used in Li (2017). 
The instructions are also included in Appendix A.  
     In the RSD experiments, subjects could earn prizes from the set {$0, $0.25, $0.50, $0.75, $1.00, 
$1.25} in any given period. Four of these six prizes were randomly selected by the software to be allocated 
among subjects in each RSD game in each period. Each group of twelve subjects was randomly assigned 
into three groups of four subjects who submitted a ranking over the prizes (in the static RSD), or who took 
turns picking a prize (in the dynamic RSD). Each group persisted throughout the experiment so that the 
groups are the units of independent observations.    
4.2 Experimental Results  
       The dynamic RSD mechanism involves rather trivial decisions, such as a choice between a bigger 
or a smaller amount of money. This implementation of an RSD mechanism makes the optimal strategy of 
choosing the biggest payoff transparent. While the static RSD mechanism is also very simple – and indeed, 
our data suggests most subjects found it to be so, it is decidedly less transparent than the dynamic RSD. In 
the static RSD, any possible ranking of prizes is permitted. If subjects realize they are in a potentially 
strategic situation, they would need to reason themselves to the dominant strategy of ranking payoffs 
according to their value. While such reasoning may typically be very natural, it is nevertheless an extra step 
or two of thinking beyond what is required for the dynamic RSD. In the dynamic RSD, one need only 
consider the available subset of the six prizes used in the experiment and pick the largest one.   
Figure 6 displays the proportion of subjects playing the dominant strategy (of ranking payoffs from 
highest to lowest) across all 20 periods in the static RSD mechanism for both high CRT and low CRT 
participants. A baseline of 81.3% of the 48 High CRT subjects played the dominant strategy in Period 1, 
which increased to over 90% by Period 20. A baseline of 64.6% of the 48 Low CRT subjects played the 
dominant strategy in Period 1, which increased to nearly 85% by Period 20. For the first period, the 
difference in performance between high and low CRT participants is marginally significant (p = 0.066, two-
tailed Z-difference in proportions test). High CRT subjects outperform low CRT subjects within each 
period. However, both High and Low CRT subjects converge toward equilibrium play with experience.  
  
                                                          
7 We used a balanced design: In two of the four static RSD sessions and one of the two dynamic RSD sessions, the 
RSD iterations were conducted first. In the other three sessions, the lottery task was conducted first. The transparent 
RSD and lottery sessions involved trivial choices (e.g., choosing directly between $0.75 and $1.00), so we felt it 
unnecessary to conduct many of these sessions. 
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Figure 6: Proportion Playing Dominant Strategies over Time in Static Random Serial Dictatorship 
 
         Performance on the dynamic RSD mechanism (proportion of payoff-maximizing choices) is 
summarized in Figure 7 alongside the proportion of payoff-maximizing rankings for the static RSD 
mechanism. This data is provided for both high and low CRT subjects and for both the first iteration and 
second iteration of the mechanism (with 10 periods per iteration). From the figure, we see again that low 
CRT subjects with experience (81.7% payoff maximizing rankings) perform similarly to high CRT subjects 
without experience (85.2% payoff-maximizing rankings) for the less transparent (static) RSD mechanism. 
In addition, the more transparent mechanism (dynamic RSD) eliminates the gap in performance between 
high and low CRT subjects, even in the first iteration.  
Figure 7. Proportion of Payoff Maximizing Decisions for the Static and Dynamic RSD Mechanism  
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4.3 Regression Model 
   To further analyze the RSD data, we implemented a simple regression model: 
(2)    𝑝𝑔 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑥𝐶𝑔 + 𝜆𝑥𝑇𝑔 + 𝜙𝑥𝐶𝑇𝑔 + 𝜀𝑔   
where 𝑝𝑔 is the proportion of periods that achieved the dominant strategy equilibrium for group 𝑔. Model 
(2) also has a mean effect size, 𝛼, a cognitive reflection parameter, 𝛾, a transparency parameter 𝜆, and a 
coefficient,𝜙, to allow for an interaction effect between cognitive reflection and transparency. The variable 
𝑥𝐶𝑔 = 0.5 for high CRT groups and 𝑥𝐶𝑔 = −0.5 for low CRT groups. The variable 𝑥𝑇𝑔 = 0.5 for groups 
in transparent RSD sessions and 𝑥𝑇𝑔 = −0.5 for groups in non-transparent RSD sessions. The variable 
𝑥𝐶𝑇𝑔 = 0.5 for groups in transparent high CRT sessions and nontransparent low CRT sessions and 𝑥𝐶𝑇𝑔 =
−0.5 for groups in nontransparent high CRT sessions and transparent low CRT sessions. As before, this 
approach parametrizes the effects of CRT and of transparency (and of their interaction) as deviations from 
a mean effect size. 
    The regression results are summarized in Table 5 (for Iteration 1) and in Table 6 (for Iteration 2). Note 
that none of the predicted values exceed one since the CRT, transparency, and interaction values each have 
a factor of 0.50 incorporated to them. From Tables 5 and 6, we see that CRT is not significant in either 
iteration. However, CRT does appear to have a systematic effect in that high CRT subjects performed better 
than low CRT subjects in the static RSD mechanism in every period of both iterations (see Figure 6). 
Moreover, in the first iteration (first 10 periods) of the static RSD mechanism, low CRT groups achieved 
the dominant strategy equilibrium in 34.2% of cases, whereas high CRT groups achieved the equilibrium 
in 57.5% of cases. Since the group is the unit of independent observations, having only 12 high CRT groups 
and 12 low CRT groups in the non-transparent RSD treatments might explain why this difference is not 
statistically significant.   
     Tables 5 and 6 also reveal that transparency is highly significant in both iterations. The transparent RSD 
mechanism performs significantly better than the non-transparent mechanism as predicted by Li (2017). 
Finally, experience also has an effect as the coefficient on both cognitive reflection and on transparency 
decrease from the first iteration to the second iteration.   
Table 5. Regression Results for Model (2): RSD Iteration 1 
Meaning of estimated parameters Estimated Values Std. Error p-value 
    
Mean Effect Size across all treatments (𝛼) 0.729 0.044 < 0.001 
Cognitive Reflection Parameter (𝛾) 0.117 0.088  0.195 
Transparency Parameter (𝜆) 0.542 0.088 < 0.001 
Interaction Effect (𝜙) -0.117 0.088 0.195 
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Table 6. Regression Results for Model (2): RSD Iteration 2 
Meaning of estimated parameters Estimated Values Std. Error p-value 
    
Mean Effect Size across all treatments (𝛼) 0.790 0.049 < 0.001 
Cognitive Reflection Parameter (𝛾) 0.088 0.098  0.381 
Transparency Parameter (𝜆) 0.388 0.098 < 0.001 
Interaction Effect (𝜙) -0.121 0.098 0.229 
 
5.   Individual Choices under Risk 
 To further study the relationship between cognitive reflection, experience, and choice architecture, 
we employed a task involving individual choices between lotteries. In transparent sessions, subjects 
participated in the dynamic RSD mechanism and transparent lottery choices. In non-transparent sessions, 
subjects participated in the static RSD mechanism and non-transparent lottery choices.  
5.1 Experimental Design 
 A total of 144 undergraduate students at a private California university participated in either a 
transparent or a non-transparent session. There were six high CRT sessions and six low CRT sessions, each 
set consisting of four non-transparent and two transparent sessions with 12 subjects per session.  
In the lottery task in each session, subjects made individual decisions between 20 pairs of lotteries 
(two iterations of a fixed set of 10 distinct lottery pairs). The same 10 lottery pairs in the same sequence 
were used for all subjects in both the first and second iteration of both the transparent and non-transparent 
lottery tasks. The lottery pairs only differed in how they were framed. An example lottery pair is given in 
Figure 8 in both the nontransparent and the transparent choice architectures. The other lottery pairs in the 
experiment were similar and are provided in Appendix B. In each lottery pair, one lottery stochastically 
dominates the other. These pairs are similar to a lottery pair used by Tversky and Kahneman (1986), 
although to our knowledge, they have not been used in conjunction with the CRT or in a series of decisions 
where subjects can modify their behavior with experience. In the transparent lottery choices, the salient 
comparison favored the optimal lottery. In the non-transparent lottery choices, the salient comparison 
favored the stochastically dominated lottery.   
The transparent sessions included the transparent RSD mechanism and transparent lottery frames. 
The non-transparent session included the non-transparent RSD mechanism and non-transparent lottery 
frames. The order of tasks (RSD versus lottery) was counterbalanced for both transparent and non-
transparent sessions. All lottery choices were variants of those in Figure 8 (including those in the figure), 
with nontransparent sessions employing the representation in the top panel of Figure 8 and transparent 
sessions employing the representation in the bottom panel. Each lottery had four possible outcomes which 
ranged, across the ten lotteries, between $0 and $0.75. Subjects received feedback after each choice as the 
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previous lottery pairs, a subject’s previous choices, and the payoffs that subject received were displayed on 
that subject’s screen below the current pair that the subject was choosing between. Once all subjects had 
recorded a choice, a spinner with 100 tick-marks would determine the ‘winning number’ for that choice.  
For instance, in the choice in Figure 8, any spinner number between 0 and 90 yielded a prize of $0.30, for 
both the red and the blue option. Subjects were paid for each of their lottery choices.  
 The software randomized the color (red or blue) and position (top or bottom) of the lotteries. The 
sequence of lottery choices was fixed and the spinner numbers were pre-drawn so that all subjects received 
the same feedback in the same order. Moreover, the random draw of numbers produced the same payouts 
for both lotteries, for each of the ten lottery pairs. This was likely due to the close similarity between each 
lottery within a pair, with prizes only differing by one winning number in each pair. However, in each pair, 
one lottery first order stochastically dominated the other.  
In a sense, the lottery experiment described here provides a stringent test of the hypothesis that 
people optimize. It is often argued that when high stakes, competition, and learning are present, rational 
behavior is more likely to emerge. In the present task, the lotteries involved small stakes (with no prize 
greater than $0.75), they faced no competition, and there was no opportunity to learn from feedback (since 
feedback was the same regardless of which choice they made). It might then be surprising if people do learn 
to optimize, particularly, in the nontransparent task, given the absence of strong incentives, competition, 
and helpful feedback. Prior to making their lottery choices, subjects read the instructions at their own pace 
and responded to four quiz questions (each worth $0.50), to check their understanding.  
 
 
Figure 8. Nontransparent Choice Architecture (Top) and Transparent Architecture (Bottom). The 
salient comparison in the nontransparent architecture (20 vs. 0 cents) favors the dominated lottery. 
5.2 Experimental Results 
   The proportion of optimal choices made by high CRT and low CRT subjects across all 20 periods 
is displayed in Figure 9 for the non-transparent lottery task (with a vertical line separating the periods from 
the first and second iterations). Note that in every period of both iterations in Figure 9, high CRT subjects 
performed better than low CRT subjects. There were 12.5% of 48 low CRT subjects and  27.1% of 48 high 
CRT subjects who chose the optimal (stochastically dominant) lottery in Period 1. This difference is 
marginally significant (two-tailed Z difference in proportions test, p = 0.073). 
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Figure 9: Proportion of Optimal Choices over Time when Salience favors Dominated Lottery 
 
For both CRT groups, a large majority of subjects in our experiment chose the dominated option 
on their first choice in the non-transparent task. Two reasons for this choice are that (i) one’s attention is 
naturally drawn to the most salient difference between lotteries which is the difference between 0 and 20 
cents that favors the dominated lottery in the top panel of Figure 8, and (ii) the dominated lottery (red) has 
more outcomes displayed which pay more than 0. However, upon inspection it is clear that the blue option 
has the dominating probability distribution as it offers at least as good a prize as red at every probability 
level and offers a strictly better prize at some probabilities.   
         The lottery task is not an environment where feedback is likely to help modify behavior. The 
difference in expected values between the lotteries is small and one could conjecture that the cognitive costs 
of computing the values of such complex lotteries is not worth the small expected gain. One might contrast 
this with the second price auction in which strong feedback (going bankrupt) and strong incentives (larger 
monetary payoffs) naturally push behavior towards the dominant strategy. Conditions which are thought to 
induce optimizing behavior – significant monetary incentives, competition, and experience are all present 
in the second price auction. Of these conditions, only experience is present for the lottery task. Given the 
preceding comments, we find it remarkable that selection of the optimal lottery increased from 12.5% to 
52.1% for low CRT subjects and from 27.1% to 81.3% for high CRT subjects. 
Summary metrics for the lottery task are also provided in Figure 10. We again see that low CRT 
subjects with experience are not very different from high CRT subjects without experience in the 
nontransparent task. However, this gap is a little larger than the gaps for the auctions and the RSD tasks. 
Also, as before, transparency reduces the gap in performance between high and low CRT subjects.  
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Figure 10: Proportion of Optimal Lottery Choices Across Treatments and Iterations 
 
5.3 Regression Model 
To further analyze the lottery choice data, we implemented a simple regression model: 
(3)    𝑝𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑥𝐶𝑠 + 𝜆𝑥𝑇𝑠 + 𝜙𝑥𝐶𝑇𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠  
where 𝑝𝑠 is the proportion of periods in which subject 𝑠, 𝑠 ∈ {1,2, … ,144} chose the dominant lottery. 
Model (3) also has a mean effect size, 𝛼, a cognitive reflection parameter, 𝛾, a transparency parameter 𝜆, 
and a coefficient,𝜙, to allow for an interaction effect between cognitive reflection and transparency. The 
variable 𝑥𝐶𝑠 = 0.5 for high CRT subjects and 𝑥𝐶𝑠 = −0.5 for low CRT subjects. The variable 𝑥𝑇𝑠 = 0.5 
for subjects in transparent sessions and 𝑥𝑇𝑠 = −0.5 for subjects in non-transparent sessions. The variable 
𝑥𝐶𝑇𝑠 = 0.5 for subjects in transparent high CRT sessions and nontransparent low CRT sessions and 𝑥𝐶𝑇𝑠 =
−0.5 for subjects in nontransparent high CRT sessions and transparent low CRT sessions. As before, this 
approach parametrizes the effects of CRT and of transparency (and of their interaction) as deviations from 
a mean effect size. 
The regression results are summarized in Table 7 (for Iteration 1) and in Table 8 (for Iteration 2). 
Note that none of the predicted values exceed one since the CRT, transparency, and interaction values each 
have a factor of 0.50 incorporated to them. From Tables 7 and 8, we see that CRT is significant in both 
iterations, with similar parameter estimates. Tables 7 and 8 also reveal that transparency is significant in 
both iterations. Finally, experience also has an effect as the coefficient on both cognitive reflection and on 
transparency decrease from the first iteration to the second iteration. This decrease is very small for 
cognitive reflection but quite large for transparency. Moreover, across each of the regression models (1), 
(2), and (3), switching from non-transparent to transparent mechanisms has a greater effect on performance 
than switching from low cognitive reflection subjects to high cognitive reflection subjects.  
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Table 7: Regression Results for Model (3): Lottery Iteration 1 
Meaning of estimated parameters Estimated Values Std. Error p-value 
    
Mean Effect Size across all treatments (𝛼) 0.708 0.025 < 0.001 
Cognitive Reflection Parameter (𝛾) 0.159 0.051  0.002 
Transparency Parameter (𝜆) 0.526 0.051 < 0.001 
Interaction Effect (𝜙) -0.109 0.051   0.033 
 
Table 8: Regression Results for Model (3): Lottery Iteration 2 
Meaning of estimated parameters Estimated Values Std. Error p-value 
    
Mean Effect Size across all treatments (𝛼) 0.800 0.031 < 0.001 
Cognitive Reflection Parameter (𝛾) 0.154 0.062  0.015 
Transparency Parameter (𝜆) 0.377 0.062 < 0.001 
Interaction Effect (𝜙) -0.133  0.062 0.035 
 
6.     Discussion  
We investigated how performance in strategyproof mechanisms and individual lottery choices is 
affected by choice architecture, experience, and cognitive reflection. We found that experience serves as a 
substitute for cognitive reflection: For each of the mechanisms in this experiment, low CRT subjects with 
experience performed similarly to high CRT subjects without experience. Further, for novel environments, 
we find the CRT to be reliable in sorting out heterogeneity in objectively rational decisions across individual 
lottery choices, random priority mechanisms, and auctions. Differences in cognitive reflection, as measured 
by the CRT, provide a unified explanation for differences in objectively rational behavior in individual and 
strategic decisions. Given this relationship between cognitive reflection and objective rationality, a 
promising area for research is to model agents who vary in objective rationality, analogous to standard 
approaches for modeling heterogeneity in subjective rationality (risk preferences, time preferences, and 
beliefs). Zhang and Levin (2017) provide a promising step in this direction.  
From a practical perspective, the CRT is important because the types of errors it measures may 
arise in the real world. For instance, in the lottery task the intuitive response seems to involve focusing on 
the salient payoff difference and choosing the alternative with the larger salient payoff. Some reflection is 
needed to detect the dominance relation. Such decisions may share similarities with consumer purchase 
decisions where looking casually or carefully at sale prices and product advertisements may determine 
whether a consumer avoids purchasing a dominated option that is cleverly ‘framed’ in the retailer’s ad.  
Another question to ask is: When does cognitive reflection matter? We conclude that cognitive 
reflection matters most in novel environments (i.e., in which agents lack experience) and in complex 
environments (in which there are many options or outcomes). We observed that gaining familiarity with 
the choice environment (through experience) or simplifying the choice environment (through choice 
architecture) leads behavior to converge toward the normative standard of objective rationality.  
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